Victoria Hattam and Carlos Yescas

From Immigration and Race to Sex and Faith: Reimagining the Politics of Opposition

IN THE SPRING OF 2006, IMMIGRANT RALLIES WERE HELD IN CITIES and towns across the United States.* Some have estimated that more than 3 million joined the protests across the country. Chicago and Los Angeles hosted the largest and most visible rallies on May 1, with estimates of 400,000 and 500,000 marching in each respectively (Bada, Fox, Selee 2006: v). These rallies, and the political coalitions that organized them, have been seen by many as marking a shift in immigrant politics:

Previous versions of this paper were presented during the following conferences: the Conference in Honor of Suzanne Berger at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—May 2009 (Cambridge); the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Annual Meeting—July 2008 (San Jose, Costa Rica); the Policy History Association Meeting—June 2008 (St. Louis). We thank all the participants and discussants for their helpful comments. We would like to thank our interviewees in Boston and specially Marcony Almeida of the Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition. We also wish to thank Arthur Bakis, Boston RCC of the Boston regional office of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; Andrea Carla for collecting the first set of Census data; J. Ricky Price, and Jack Powers for their help creating graphs; and the Gay Liberation Network of Chicago for letting us use their photos of the 2008 rallies.

from laying low to coming out of the shadows. Thousands of immigrants marching in the streets politicized U.S. immigration policy and proposed reforms. The rallies, and those who organized them, were trying to counter the growing anti-immigrant sentiment that had been voiced in many arenas over the past half decade. Lou Dobbs' nightly rants against "illegal aliens," the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances and laws in at least 40 locales, numerous politicians calling for a fortification of the U.S.-Mexican border, and the Minute Men Project—which took policing of the southern border into their own hands—made apparent the growing hostility toward immigrant populations across the United States.[1]

Anti-immigrant sentiment came to a head in national politics when Congressmen Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) introduced H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, into the 109th Congress. The bill contained several important provisions including: mandating construction of 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexican border; requiring employer verification of workers' legal status; ending the practice of "catch and release"; and newly criminalizing undocumented immigrants and those who assist them. The bill passed the House of Representatives on December 16, 2005 by a vote of 239 to 182.[2] Sensenbrenner had already established a strong anti-immigration profile by sponsoring the Real ID Act, which tied citizenship or legal residency to the ability to apply for a driver license. The Real ID Act was eventually signed into law on May 11, 2005 as a rider to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (H.R. 1268).[3] After the Real ID rider passed, Sensenbrenner embarked on a more ambitious anti-immigrant campaign via H.R. 4437. The impending Senate vote on H.R. 4437 catalyzed immigrant rights protests across the country the following spring.

The 2006 rallies were not the first pro-immigrant mobilizations in the United States; as with anti-immigrant politics, there were deep roots to the spring demonstrations. Two earlier campaigns, in particular, had been especially important in paving the way for the massive mobilizations. Earlier fights over driver's licenses and in-state tuition

for undocumented migrants were crucial in building networks and strategies needed to mount subsequent mass mobilizations. Various in-state tuition campaigns crystalized around the failed DREAM Act (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minorities Act) introduced into Congress on October 24, 2007. The proposed bill aimed to give undocumented immigrants access to college and the armed services. Similarly, driver's license campaigns in a dozen states, which aimed to grant state driver's licenses without requiring a Social Security number, created networks that prefigured the 2006 rallies. Initially, the local driver's license campaigns had considerable backing among law enforcement agencies and stood a good chance of being approved. However, after September 11, 2001, support evaporated and many state bills failed to pass local legislatures.[4]

In 2006, immigrant rights activists built on the earlier in-state tuition and driver's license campaigns, but this time their actions caught the media attention in new ways as hundreds of thousands marched in large cities and small towns. Newspapers across the country carried photos of thousands marching in the streets on April 10 and May 1. Photographs from Los Angeles and Chicago were especially stunning, and appeared on the front page of newspapers across the country, thereby bringing new visibility to immigration policy. We wanted to know more about the spring 2006 rallies: What institutions and movements had helped propel the immigrant rallies to national visibility? Who were the organizers? How long had immigrant rights groups been organizing? More specifically, we wanted to examine the coalitions themselves: Who was in and who was out? Was there evidence of the long anticipated Black-brown coalition between African Americans and new immigrants being forged? (Browning, Rogers Marshall, and Traub 1990; Hattam 2007; Haney-López 2005).[5] To answer these questions we conducted fieldwork in Boston in 2008 and 2009.

WHY BOSTON?

Boston is not the most obvious research site for exploring immigrant rights coalitions. After all, the Boston rallies of April 10 and May 1,

Table I: Foreign-Born Population for the City of Boston and National Average (1870–2000)



Data Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. American FactFinder.

2006 were small; only 2,000 people rallied at the Boston Common on May 1. Additional rallies were held in East Boston/Chelsea (5,000) and Somerville (1,000), but even allowing for these dispersed sites, the numbers were not large in any terms.[6] More had marched in the previous rallies held on April 10, 2006, but neither reached the level of Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, or New York. Why choose a city where the rallies were small?

Initially, we selected Boston for two reasons: access and demographics. Carlos Yescas had worked in the Mexican consulate for over four years and had excellent contacts both in Boston and in the New England area more generally. We hoped this would allow us to explore and compare both contemporary efforts at coalition building as well as transnational forces shaping immigrant politics in the United States. Second, the presence of large numbers of undocumented Irish immigrants in Massachusetts—currently estimated at 60,000—provided an important opportunity for examining the role of white immigrants in contemporary immigrant rights coalitions.[7] We report on issues of transnationalism and white ethnics in another paper (Hattam and Yescas 2008).

While conducting the research, a third factor emerged that made Massachusetts an especially important research site for innovative coalition-building that is the focus of this paper. The presence of the gay marriage movement (Mass Equality) in support of the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling legalizing same-sex marriage in the landmark case of *Goodridge v. Mass. Department of Public Health* (440 Mass. 309, 798 NE2d 941) of November 23, 2008. Our research revealed, somewhat to our surprise, that the cutting edge of coalition politics did not lie at the nexus of immigration and race, but centered instead on emerging affinities and tensions between gay rights and immigrant rights advocates. The intersecting mobilizations around sexuality and migration are changing rapidly. We now believe that new identifications are being forged and discrimination is being reimagined in ways that will likely shape the broad contours of immigration politics for decades to come. The paper proceeds into two parts: part one examines competing coalitions over immigration and race, and part two considers the intersection of sexuality and migration.

Before presenting our research, it helps to map Boston's changing demographics. Population shifts have been rapid over the last three decades, so much so that the nonwhite residents of Boston passed the 50 percent mark in 2000.[8] The change has not only occurred in Boston proper as the ethnic make-up of many surrounding towns has changed as well.[9] According to the U.S. Census of 2000, over a quarter of Boston's population were foreign born.[10] The percentage of foreign born for the year 2000 is comparable with that of the 1930s and 1940s when the city was among the 10 largest urban centers with foreign-born populations. Interestingly, the percentage of Boston's foreign-born consistently has remained at least twice that of the foreign-born population for the nation as a whole (see table 1). In 1950, for example, the foreign born population for the United States was 6.9 percent and rose to 10.4 percent in 2000 while the foreign born in Boston was 18.6 percent in 1950 and 25.8 percent in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001: 9).

Thus, while Boston generally is not considered a gateway city on a scale comparable to Miami, New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles, immi-

gration has been an important component of the Boston metropole for the past 100 years.

In 2000, the top 10 countries of origin for Boston's foreign-born population were as follows: Haiti (10 percent), Dominican Republic (8 percent), China (7 percent), Vietnam (6 percent), El Salvador (4 percent), Jamaica (4 percent), Cape Verde (4 percent), Colombia (3 percent), Ireland (3 percent), and Brazil (3 percent). This makes recent immigration to Boston very different from that of the 1950s, when the bulk of the immigrant population in Boston was of European descent. Both the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts more generally are important centers of family reunification for immigrants from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cape Verde, and Ireland.[11] Table 2 identifies the country of origin of Boston immigrants as recorded in the 2006 American Community Survey.

Although immigrants are frequently drawn to large metropoles, smaller cities and towns also have been transformed. According to the Census Bureau, the surrounding towns of Chelsea and Lynn have become home to recent immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ecuador, while the population of Lowell and parts of Somerville now include large numbers of Dominicans and Brazilians, respectively, as well as other Latino and Caribbean immigrant from Haiti. In Malden, Medford, and Quincy, Chinese, Vietnamese and other Asian immigrants have increasingly replaced an earlier generation of Irish immigrants.[12]

On April 11, 2006, one day after the first rally, the *Boston Globe* published pictures of shuttered storefronts in Jamaica Plain and other immigrant neighborhoods when the "day without immigrants," as in much of the rest of the country, only became a partial reality. The immigrant boycott was mostly felt in Alston-Brighton, Jamaica Plain, East Boston, and East Cambridge, where large numbers of Brazilian, Mexican, Salvadoran, Vietnamese, and Chinese migrants have opened businesses or now staff big chain outlets. Their presence has revitalized main streets and urban malls that had been abandoned decades ago, when many white residents left the city for the outer suburbs.

Table 2. Immigrants by Country of Origin, City of Boston and Surrounding Towns (2006)

	Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Metro Area		Boston City		Cambridge City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Total Population	4,455,217	100.0	575,187	100.0	89,804	100.0
Total Foreign-Born Population:	706,422	15.9	156,591	27.2	25,851	28.8
Europe:	162,488	3.6	26,044	4.5	5,798	6.4
Northern Europe:	34,644	0.8	5,725	1.0	1,485	1.6
United Kingdom	17,633	0.4	1,861	0.3	686	0.8
Ireland	13,743	0.3	3,864	0.7	263	0.3
Western Europe	19,874	0.4	3,261	0.6	1,121	1.2
Southern Europe:	53,322	1.2	5,955	1.0	1,444	1.6
Italy	22,586	0.5	3,771	0.6	476	0.5
Portugal	20,181	0.4	177	--	620	0.7
Eastern Europe	54,371	1.2	11,103	1.9	1,748	1.9
Asia:	202,910	4.5	35,992	6.2	10,216	11.3
China	65,831	1.5	13,679	2.4	3,674	5.0
India	34,336	0.8	1,870	0.3	1,051	1.2
Vietnam	25,111	0.6	8,714	1.5	225	0.2
Africa:	53,328	1.2	15,975	2.8	3,474	3.9
Americas:	286,269	6.4	78,334	13.6	6,195	6.9
Latin America:	262,081	5.9	76,372	13.3	5,687	6.3
Caribbean	111,169	2.5	42,604	7.4	3,239	3.6
Mexico	9,667	0.2	2,515	0.4	174	0.2
El Salvador	20,500	0.5	5,915	1.0	200	0.2
Brazil	56,247	1.3	6,990	1.2	39	--
Colombia	18,374	0.4	6,340	1.1	227	0.2
Canada	23,845	0.5	1,913	0.3	508	0.6

N: absolute number –: less than 0.1%

Data source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "2006 American Community Survey." Data are estimates based on a sample. For more information, such as margin of error, sampling error, and so on. see US Census. Percentages estimated by Andrea Carla.

Scholars and activists alike have been especially interested in tacking immigrant settlement patterns with an eye to identifying multiracial and multiethnic neighborhoods in which no one nationality or race dominates social and political life (the assumption being that the possibilities for coalition building might be especially promising in such diverse communities) (Sanjek 1998; Browning, Marshall, and Taub 1990; Hattam 2007; Haney-López 2005). In the greater Boston metropolitan area, ethnic and racial diversity is especially notable in Jamaica Plain, East Cambridge, and parts of Somerville. While some neighborhoods continue to be dominated by a single national origin or racial group (Back Bay, Beacon Hill, Mattapan, and Roxbury in Boston and the corridor from Kendall through Central, Harvard, and Porter Squares are all predominantly either white or Black. While Chinatown and East Boston remain predominantly Chinese and Hispanic respectively), the general pattern has been for a decline in ethnic and racial separation over the last twenty years (Allen and Turner 2004). Demographics again suggest that the time might be ripe for forging new political identifications and alliances.

COMPETING COALITIONS: MIRA AND GBIO

We began this research with an eye to assessing coalition building between African Americans and immigrants during the 2006 rallies. Were new immigrants changing the political landscape by reconfiguring the Black-white divide, as many scholars have been anticipating? Our research quickly led us to reframe the question. The presence or absence of a Black-brown coalition seemed too crude a measure of the changes at hand. More subtle shifts were afoot that required a more focused lens. The issue was not whether coalitions were being formed, but rather one of acknowledging competing coalitions. Many organizations were trying to mobilize diverse populations into competing coalitions.

Two of the most active organizations working to build broad coalitions across identity groups in the Boston area are the Massachusetts Immigration and Refugee Advocacy (MIRA) and the Greater Boston

Interfaith Organization (GBIO). Both have stood the test of time, with MIRA being established in 1988 and GBIO in 1996. Both also have substantial staff and active programs and offer a perfect starting point for exploring coalition building in contemporary Boston. Attending to the differences between MIRA and GBIO also helps capture one of the central political fault-lines running through contemporary immigrant politics in Boston and elsewhere: the difficulty of holding race *and* immigration together in the same organization. While both organizations have an impressive record of coalition building, they reach out to different constituents on very different terms. As of now, however, neither organization has forged the Black-brown coalition that many activists and academics have been anticipating.

MIRA is a Boston-based nonprofit organization with 100 member organizations and a staff of 15. Its mission is to "promote rights and opportunities of immigrants and refugees," largely through shaping public policies that affect their lives. Organizers at MIRA were closely connected to the immigrant rights rallies in 2006, with Marconi Almeida helping to plot the route for the April 10 rally. Much of the group's work has focused on lobbying the state and federal governments; tellingly, the MIRA website provides contact information to local state and federal politicians and encourages members to lobby on behalf of key immigrant rights concerns. A viewer of the group's website is likely to encounter calls to lobby state-level politicians. For example, on May 4, 2009, the two lead items on the MIRA website were "Immigrant's Day at the State House 2009" and "MIRA FY10" in which a list of budgetary amendments was provided and readers were urged to contact their legislators. Interestingly, a web link was provided to facilitate communication between MIRA members and their relevant legislative officers.[13]

Even a cursory glance at MIRA makes clear its investment in coalition building: this is not an identity- or nationality-based organization, but an organization that works to forge connections *across* different national origin groups. As its name suggests, one of the important difference MIRA seeks to bridge is that between *immigrants* and *refugees*. This is important

political work because the difference in political status between undocumented immigrants and refugees often has created fissures between the two, thereby fracturing potential coalitions. A quick look at the list of member organizations reveals that this is no stovepipe institution: member organizations include among others the Association of Haitian Women, the Bosnian Community Center for Resource Development, the Boston Center for Refugee Health and Human Rights, the Boston Chinatown Neighborhood Center, the Brazilian Immigrant Center, the Cambridge Portuguese Credit Union, the Cape Verdean Association of Brockton, the Irish Immigration Center, the Jewish Community Relations Council, and Jobs with Justice. The organization's ambition is to link fates of a diverse array of national origin groups through a federated institution capable of leading common political action.

Probing the coalition more deeply still, we wanted to know whether and in what ways MIRA saw contemporary struggles over immigrant rights as connected to earlier civil rights movements for African Americans. One of the organizers we interviewed moved easily among the languages of civil rights, immigrant rights, and human rights. However, when pressed on the linkages between race and immigration it became clear that their was a considerable gulf between speaking about the importance of civil rights and a more active bridging of the long-standing division between immigrants and African Americans (Hattam 2007, chaps. 3-4). When specifically asked about the connection between civil and immigrant rights, the interviewee noted that there had been a wonderful speech given by the Reverend Nelson at the Low Income Immigrant Rights Conference held on December 6, 2007 at the National Immigration Law Center in Washington, D.C.[14] While Johnson's speech is indeed powerful and makes the case for connecting immigration and racial issues, we were struck by the fact that the bridging figure was so far from home. No reference was made to similar instances of such linkage within MIRA or of events in Massachusetts.[15] Put simply, the link between civil rights and immigrant rights was there rhetorically, but was not apparent when it came to the daily business of MIRA's organizational work.

The absence of an active engagement with earlier civil rights organizations places a crucial limit on MIRA's coalition building. In MIRA's defense, one might argue that this is simply not MIRA's mission; after all, it is an immigrant not a civil rights organization. But simply to declare questions of race as beyond MIRA's jurisdiction misses the point, since it assumes a separation of immigration and race many believe the new immigration might be reworking. The pressing political question is whether new immigrants will identify by nationality, race, or some other term. How these identifications play out is the question and cannot be ruled out of court as beyond the organization's mission.

Across town, GBIO has been building a rather different coalition. It, too, has created an important umbrella organization bringing together 70 institutions representing approximately 50,000 members—"a diverse mix," the group claims, "economically, racially, geographically, and otherwise" united in their commitment to faith as a medium for social and political change. GBIO was established in 1996 by 45 clergy and community leaders who wanted to build a new organization that would transcend Boston's "historic divides" especially those of race and class.[16] Bridging racial division through faith has remained central throughout. The organization includes a wide range of congregations, including the Roxbury Presbyterian Church, Temple Emmanuel in Newton, Trinity Church in Back Bay, and the Catholic Sisters Collaborative.

Like MIRA, GBIO directs much of its energy toward changing policy at the state level. Matters of housing, health care, elder care, and education have been important areas of concern for several years. They have led to important victories, including passage of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts $100-million Housing Trust Fund, winning a $2 million increase for Boston Public School textbooks and supplies, and successfully supported the Justice for Janitors campaign to win significant pay and benefit increases. GBIO does not shy away from political engagement but rather draws on religious commitment as an impetus for political change. At the Delegates Assembly at Temple Emanuel in Newton, Massachusetts, held on April 8, 2008, GBIO invited Secretary of Elder

Affairs Michael Festa, and made him gather together in the front of the synagogue to commit to political change in the eyes of God.[17] Similarly, at the even larger tenth anniversary action held on Tuesday, May 27, 2008, Governor Deval Patrick was in attendance, with the same intention of having him commit in public to certain political change.[18] The policy demands in and of themselves are not enormous—the significance of their political work lies less in the policy changes sought than in their use of faith to build common cause across deep racial divides. For more than 13 years now, a diverse group of clergy and parishioners has come together creating connections where few existed before. Although the policy goals are modest, the underlying bridge building is impressive in its ambition to reconfigure previously divisive identifications.

At GBIO meetings, racial diversity is front and center. GBIO brings Black and white ministers and congregants together. The Delegates Assembly of April 8, 2008, for example, was led jointly by Reverend Hurmon Hamilton of the Roxbury Presbyterian Church and Abby Flam of Temple Emanuel in Newton, who shared duties throughout the service. The congregation was equally diverse, about half-Black and half-white. We estimate that there were also approximately 20 Muslims in attendance. Yet, questions of immigration are strangely absent.

As with MIRA, some colleagues have suggested that it is a mistake to expect GBIO to bridge race and immigration, since it is not itself an immigrant organization. From our perspective, such arguments again presume too narrow an historical frame for thinking about migration. After all, several Jewish congregations were founding partners of the interfaith organization and certainly have been deeply connected to issues of migration and ethnic difference (Hattam 2007, chaps. 3-4). More important still, we do not accept that immigration is beyond GBIO's mandate. Interestingly, GBIO might begin to be engaged in immigration through the Haitian Nursing Home Worker Campaign. A group of Haitian workers within GBIO presented four complaints: disrespect in the workplace, low wages, no health care, and poor staffing ratios. GBIO began by tackling the issue of disrespect and this then led to broader support for the health-care initiatives in Massachusetts.

GBIO itself suggested that the Haitian Nursing Home campaign gained broad support "as many GBIO members worried that the maltreatment of workers was also affecting the quality of care elderly parents were receiving in nursing homes" (GBIO 2008). Although this rationale for broad-based mobilization is framed narrowly, with the treatment of one's relatives rather than social justice driving the appeal, there is no doubt that GBIO has begun to reach across class and race lines in this nursing-home worker campaign. Although the home health-care workers' concerns are frequently posed in terms of class rather than migration, it is not difficult to see ways in which immigration might be made more central to the GBIO's agenda.

Although it is clear that there has been extensive coalition building among Boston's diverse populations for more than a decade, yet the Black-brown coalition that many academics and activists have been anticipating does *not* seem to be the pressing order of the day. In MIRA, where immigration issues are front and center, racial difference recedes—and at GBIO where race is at the forefront of the organization, immigration tends to slip from view. The coalition building that is being undertaken should not be underestimated. It is difficult and important work that operates on a smaller scale aimed at rather different coalition partners than the academic literature had led us to expect. The key question for most individuals and organizations in Boston at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century is not identity politics versus coalition building, but rather which of the many possible coalitions should one join? Which of the competing alliances and umbrella organizations will likely come to dominate the political landscape? Or if no one organization triumphs, how will multiple coalitions operate together? These questions take us beyond the issues of whether immigrants and African Americans are forming Black-brown coalitions to ask instead: How are immigrant and racial identities being reworked and by whom? And to what ends? Our research has allowed us to appreciate the coalitional work that is going on today while simultaneously recognizing that it is as of yet a considerable distance from large scale African American-immigrant coalition.

QUEER MIGRATIONS: TENSIONS OVER IMMIGRATION, SEX, AND FAITH

While MIRA and GBIO are the most prominent organizations working at the intersection of race and immigration, they were not the only coalition initiatives to emerge from our research. In fact, connections between issues of sexual orientation and immigration were equally, if not more, pressing. Looking back over our interviews, we have been struck by the growing political activity at the intersection of immigration and gay rights. These efforts are not yet institutionalized in a robust fashion. Nevertheless, the energy, spontaneity, and proliferation of these connections demand further attention. Building an immigrant-gay rights coalition is no easy task; it requires rethinking existing conceptions of both discrimination and affiliation; there is growing evidence that such reconfigurations are under way, that have, as yet, received too little scholarly attention.

Evidence that relations between sexual orientation and immigration are changing is manifested both positively (in a variety of efforts bringing the two social movements together) and negatively (in the opposition that such political work frequently generates). Not all welcome this re-imaging—many oppose linking the political fate of these two traditionally distinct identities. Of course, there have always been gay immigrants, but in decades past there was little or no political space for embracing both identifications. Rather, individuals were pushed to choose one identity over the other, thereby leaving the gay rights organizations vulnerable to criticisms that they are presumptively a white mobilization—and conversely, leaving most discussions of immigration silent on questions of sexual orientation (Somerville 1994; Cohen 1997).

The movement to legalize same-sex marriage in Massachusetts (MASS Equality) has loomed large in Boston politics over the last decade. It placed the actions of the state legislature and state Supreme Court at the center of the debate on the question of gay marriage. Advocates for and against changing marriage law converged in Boston after the Massachusetts Supreme Court gave the right to same-sex

couples to wed. Even after this decision, some in the legislature sought to prohibit such unions by introducing anti-gay marriage ballot initiatives only to be defeated during constitutional conventions. Pro-gay campaigners anticipated this possibility and used their extensive network and press connections to defeat this rearguard action (Somos Latinos LGBT 2008).

Despite the ultimate same-sex marriage victory, the political campaign fueled tensions among residents of the commonwealth. The debate was not limited to the halls of the State House but extended into many political arenas and had input from many constituencies. Churches, universities, labor unions, and employers had to think about the implications that such unions would have. Immigrants were not exempt from the debate, both because many immigrants were themselves gay and wondered how changing marriage laws might intersect with questions of immigration status, and because many immigrants viewed issues of sexual discrimination broadly and thus considered sexual discrimination as part of a linked fate. Not surprisingly, immigrants, like the rest of the population, are divided over the question of gay marriage. Some sought refuge in Catholic and Evangelist churches, and denounced the new law. Others turned a blind eye to the issue and remained within their immigrant communities, ostracizing any gay or lesbian members while avoiding political action. Still others welcomed the development as a way to break free from the constraints of conservative groups and families and worked to build a progressive coalition that might address discrimination in many forms.

Perhaps the most striking evidence signaling an immigrant-gay rights alliance can be found by comparing photographs taken at the 2006 and 2008 immigrant rallies. In 2006, almost no rainbow flags were to be seen—by 2008, they cover the scene. Take for example two photographs from the Chicago immigrant rallies in figures 1 and 2: in 2006, over 400,000 marched in the streets holding flags from many nations, but note that there are few if any rainbow flags in that demonstration. By 2008, the scene has changed dramatically. Now not only do rainbow flags abound, there are several banners declaring immigrant-gay affili-

AP Photo/Charles Rex Arbogast (May 2, 2006)

Figure 1

ation: "Lesbians and Gays Support Immigrant Rights!" and "Latino Gay Community."

In fact, there were some rainbow flags at the 2006 rallies, but they were few in number, do not appear in most photographs at the time, and were not readily understood as signaling an immigrant-gay rights alliance. Blogs after the 2006 rallies capture the difference. For example, one blogger, Cinnachick, posted a few photos of people holding rainbow flags at the immigrant rights rally on Flickr on May 1, 2006 with the following comment attached: "I was hoping for more signs like this from a variety of organizations. I hope some of them were on the other leg of the march, but I kinda doubt it." Several bloggers responded to Cinnachick's post echoing her uncertainty. One comment stated: "I saw rainbow flags here in L.A. and hoped they were about LGBT support for immigrant rights. I suspect they may have been about diversity but I prefer to believe the former." Another blogger replied: "I saw several rainbow flags and assumed they were all gay rights, but now I wonder if they were more for diversity." By 2008 the uncertainty has gone: rainbow flags proliferate, are readily visible, and are assumed to be signaling LGBT support for immigrant rallies (Flickr 2006).

While the images are from Chicago rather than Boston, they echo data from our Boston fieldwork. The Latino gay and lesbian communities in Boston have been active within the Mass Equality coalition, celebrating Latino LGBT Pride for the last six years, and participating with a float in the Boston LGBT Parade. The most active group is the Somos Latinos LGBT organization, with smaller groups of individuals participating in the large LGBT organizations of Massachusetts.[19] Both the directors of Somos Latinos LGBT and Marcony Almeida from MIRA mentioned that they had held meetings with Mass Equality to have them join the MIRA coalition, but that has yet to happen. Somos Latinos LGBT has been actively organizing events aimed at bringing issues of sexuality and immigration together. We attended one such occasion at Roxbury Community College on May 15, 2008.[20]

To be sure, a few images or meetings cannot establish whether new coalitions are being formed, but they can alert us to possible changes at hand that can be corroborated through additional research. In fact, this

Anonymous/GayLiberation.net (May 2, 2008)

Figure 2

is what happened. We entered the field intending to examine the intersection of race and immigration, but initially through the photographs and then through our interviews, we came to see the cutting edge of politics forming at the intersection of sex and faith rather than race and immigration. Moreover, the contrast between the 2006 and 2008 photographs suggests that things may be changing rapidly, since there is only a two-year gap between these very different images. Our interviews also suggest a generational dynamic at work around the place of gay rights within a new politics of opposition: older interviewees, in more establish immigrant advocacy organizations, frequently ignored LGBT issues, while younger organizers more readily embraced gay rights within a broad conception of anti-discrimination. A decade ago, one might occasionally see same-sex couples at Gay Pride marches, holding signs saying "Binational-Biracial couple."[21] But such placards drawing attention to the intersection of immigration and sexuality were rare and seldom garnered much attention. Today, pride parades frequently have immigrant-LGBT groups marching alongside national organizations.

However, linking immigration and sexuality is not without its risks, especially for those working closely with conservative synagogues and churches; many opposed this new alliance and have worked hard to keep immigrant and gay rights issues apart. Tracking opposition to this new political formation offers another gauge of the changes at hand while revealing the dilemmas of coalition building in which many immigrant rights advocates find themselves caught between the competing demands of diverse coalition partners.

Almeida, one of our interviewees, made the tension between immigrant and gay rights explicit. He had long been involved in immigration reform and was responsible for planning the route for the April 10, 2006 rally. Once he announced the route for the march, he recounted, he immediately received several phone calls from gay rights activists protesting his decision.

> Our rally started in the Boston Common and ended up in the Baptist Church, the very famous one that they have on

> Tremont Street. So there was the final speech and the end of the rally. And I remember because my name was out there, cause I was kinda the head of the organizers for that rally, I got two phone calls, from two gay activists who said, "do you know that that church, the past of that church is of Romney's friends, and he is part of the national group to defeat gays, and they say that the gays are the devil." . . . I had no clue (Almeida May 2008).

For Almeida, the tension between the Baptist Church's progressive position on some issues and its hostility to gay rights was palpable. Ending the rally at the Tremont Street church brought divisions between immigrant and gay rights to the fore. How to navigate these tensions was not always clear.

Opposition to an immigrant-gay rights coalition also was evident in the pressure some evangelical churches placed on a local Brazilian newspaper. Among his many other activities, Almeida is also coeditor of a local Brazilian newspaper, *The Brazilian Journal*, published in Everett, Massachusetts. During our interview, Almeida recalled occasions in which one of the neighborhood churches servicing a significant Brazilian population made clear that it would withhold advertising in *The Brazilian Journal* if it ran gay-friendly ads and articles. Since church advertising revenue was crucial for keeping the paper afloat, the pressure to keep issues of sexual orientation and immigration apart was considerable. Thus far, *The Brazilian Journal* has resisted the pressure, but Almeida was well aware of the costs his decision to ignore church demands might entail (Almeida May 2008).

A recent post from the Center for Immigration Studies—one of the most influential restrictionist think tanks on this issue—also revealed increased awareness of the opportunities that the emerging immigration-sexuality alliance offers to anti-immigrant advocates. The post by David North entitled "Same-Sex Marriage and Immigration Rights—An Issue That Could Tear Apart the Open Borders Coalition?" strategized about contemporary immigrant politics:

> It appears to me unlikely that an immigration bill acceptable to the restrictionists will come out of the current Congress; perhaps the most that the restrictionists can hope for is no bill at all—and a lusty gay marriage dispute among the Open Borders types would, indeed, be very helpful.
>
> Were I a restrictionist lobbist I would encourage the addition of Barney Frank's bill in the overall immigration reform legislation at the committee level; this would be an (admittedly devious) effort to build into the legislative package a provision that would make the whole bill less likely to pass. In the field of corporate mergers such maneuvers are called "poison pills" (North 2009).

Many, it seems, are aware of the new political formations and are planning how best to turn it to their own advantage. Political analysts and immigrant rights advocates would do well to attend more closely to this new battleground.

To be sure, churches are by no means monolithic when it comes to questions of sexuality: some are considerably more open than others. Indeed, it has become a common practice for congregations to signal an openness on questions of sexuality by placing a rainbow flag on the notice board (see figure 3). Such actions underscore the importance of attending to internal conflicts over immigration and sexuality within particular denominations and congregations. It would be useful for immigrant advocacy groups to design a logo that could be used by various institutions—including the churches—to signal a pro-immigrant position along side the rainbow flag. A simple visual cueing would facilitate the complex task of coalition building within this hotly contested terrain. As of now, no such signaling device exists and it is difficult to discern a particular congregation's views on immigration from a distance.

WHY AN IMMIGRANT-GAY RIGHTS COALITION?

Even though coalition building at the intersection of immigration and sexuality has met with considerable opposition, our research shows



Newton, MA/Carlos Yescas (June 10, 2008

Figure 3

that this remains a vibrant area of political mobilization. If this is indeed the cutting edge of immigrant politics, we need to understand what undergirds this emerging immigration-gay rights coalition. Is the affinity a product of historical contingency in which the close temporal proximity of the gay marriage and immigrant rallies in Boston made

possible connections that are not apparent elsewhere? Or is there a deeper affinity at work? To be sure, the close sequencing of Boston's gay marriage movement and immigrant rights rallies made connections easier, but we have come to understand that there is more than historical coincidence at work here. We have come to see a connection between sexuality and migration that, once understood, allows us to appreciate the larger significance of the Boston immigrant-gay rights coalition. If we are to take full advantage of the political opportunities ahead, it is crucial that this deeper connection be understood.

Classic histories of the gay rights movement in the United States have long noted that many gays and lesbians were drawn to San Francisco and New York in the hope of finding safety and community in numbers in large metropoles (Chauncey 1995; D'Emilio 1983; Weston 1995). We have begun to see a parallel process at the international level in which many gays and lesbians move around the world in order to escape the strictures of heteronormative regimes at home. From this perspective, heteronormativity generates queer migrations both within the nation-state and around the globe. If we are right here, the emergence of Mass Equality and immigration politics in Boston over the last half-decade harbors an important lesson for opposition movements around the world.

But leaving our account of sexual orientation and migration here is somewhat misleading: one additional step in the argument is needed. The problem lies in the implication that Boston and other U.S. cities are beacons of tolerance and openness on *both* the national and international level. But this is not so: there is a crucial difference in terms of openness when one shifts from the national to an international frame. U.S. immigration policy, after all, is deeply restrictive. Moreover, the limitations to entry are themselves replete with deep heteronormative assumptions, thereby creating important asymmetries between the role of American cities at the level of the nation and globe. Siobhan Somerville's brilliant re-reading of the 1952 Immigration Act in which she traces the sexual politics contained within American immigration law, and specifically within the family reunification provisions, makes

plain the strictures America places on queer migrations. The restrictions are not accidental, but rather stem from assumptions about who is family both at home and abroad (Luibheid 2002; Somerville 2005).

The limits of American cities as havens for queer migrants quickly became apparent after the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized gay marriage. Perhaps somewhat naively, some same-sex, binational couples hoped that *Goodridge* would allow *them* to change the immigration status of a non-U.S. partner. Activists had to mobilize quickly to inform binational, same-sex couples that *Goodridge* did not protect them because federal immigration law would trump state marriage law. Thus undocumented immigrants who wished to wed under the newly established same-sex marriage law still risked deportation under federal immigration policy. The danger of deportation was conveyed to a group of binational gay couples at Northeastern University in Boston when the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders organization (GLAD) held events to elaborate the consequences of the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling for gay binational couples (Thomson 2005).[22] This double jeopardy of immigration and marriage law has gathered little attention in mainstream media because as yet few advocacy groups address the complex intersection of sexuality and immigration.

It is precisely these tensions between immigration and sexuality, and efforts to bridge them, that we saw many activists trying to navigate in our Boston fieldwork. How these conflicting pressures are negotiated in the near future will be of great consequence to the contours of immigrant politics for years to come.

PROSPECTS FOR A NEW POLITICS OF OPPOSITION

We draw two broad conclusions from our research. First, we have been impressed by the length and robustness of immigrant rights politics in Boston. Several organizations have been in operation for more than a decade, some for two—evidence of considerable staying power in a world known for the fragility and transience of its organizations. Moreover, we have been struck by the importance of broad coalition building as a central goal of many organizations and activists work-

ing in the Boston area. To be sure, the precise contours of the different umbrella organizations vary with each envisioning rather different coalitions: MIRA and GBIO, for example, have both worked hard to bring a wide range of organizations into a progressive coalition. But which groups they tap, and how they envision the frontiers of change, are quite different. Thus, the pressing issue is not so much whether to form coalitions; the political arithmetic makes the power of numbers an appealing strategy across the board. The contentious issue is which coalitions to join and on what terms. Coalitions are clearly forming; the question is on whose term.

Second, we have been impressed by emerging collaborations between immigrant and gay rights organizations. It is too early to tell whether deep and enduring identifications are being reworked into new political formations, since much of the evidence comes from opposition to these very same collaborations. Tensions between faith-based and gay rights mobilizations have been readily apparent, suggesting that historical tensions between these two groups might thwart the emerging collaborations. Nevertheless, synergies from joint mobilizations between gay and immigrant rights activists persist; whether they will be sustained and institutionalized in the decade ahead is what bears watching. Whether immigration and sexual politics play out as complementary or divisive forces will set the parameters of immigrant politics in the forseable future.

NOTES

1. For accounts of anti-immigrant politics, see the Carlos Sandoval and Catherine Tambini documentary *Farmingville* (2000); Ostendorf (2001 and 2005); ; and Cummings (2005). For passage of local anti-immigrant ordinances, Kotlowitz (2007). Perhaps two of the most prominent anti-immigrant local ordinances were passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania and Carpentersville, Illinois. For two important accounts of immigrant day laborers, see Fine (2006) and Gordon (2005).
2. For a full account of H.R.4437, see <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.04437>. The bill was eventually defeated in the Senate.

3. The Real ID Act started off as H.R. 418, which passed the House and then stalled until added as a rider to a Supplemental Appropriations bill. Sensenbrenner was the original author of H. R. 418.
4. Similar legislative initiatives had been introduced on several occasions from 2001 on. On October 24, 2007, the bill was introduced for a vote and was defeated by a filibuster and was not bought to the floor. The vote was 52 in favor; 8 votes short of what was needed to end the filibuster.
5. We follow the historic convention of capitalizing Black but not white or brown—a convention that signals the asymmetries inherent in American racial categories.
6. Despite the small numbers at the marches, over 20 organizations were members of, or endorsed, the Boston May Day Coalition and other organizations have been active in immigrant rights politics for over a decade. See <www.bostonmayday.org>.
7. Advocacy groups for the Irish community interviewed for this research use this estimate. No official numbers exist for undocumented immigrants.
8. These figures are taken from the Office of New Bostonians within the mayor's office. The Office of New Bostonians was established in 1998 to "meet the needs of the growing and changing immigrant and newcomer communities in Boston." See <http://www.cityofboston.gov/newbostonians>.
9. The numbers provided here for the city of Boston are those reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the incorporated city of Boston, not including the greater metropolitan area. Data collected for the greater Boston are collected from the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). Total counts are available from the American Fact Finder. Cities and towns in the western part of the state, such as Worcester and Holyoke, also have received new waves of migrants. The north and south shores also have seasonal migration or house small communities from Latin America. However, they are not included here, as there was no recorded immigrant rallies in 2006 there.

10. The foreign-born population in 1950 stood at 149,000 and 151,836 in 2000. While the actual numbers only increased by 2,836 individuals, they account for a larger percentage of the population due a decline in the native population of the state. The data collected refers to the population within the incorporated city of Boston as presented by Campbell Gibson in his annual reports for the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau, which is available at <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/index.html>.
11. This data was obtained from the Boston regional office of the U.S. Bureau of the Census with special help from Arthur Bakis.
12. We analyzed data from the 1950, 1990, and 2000 Census surveys. Carlos Yescas collected census-tract data for the cities and neighborhoods mentioned here; hereafter this information will be credited as ACS and the responding number and data set. Andrea Carla provided invaluable help in collecting data from the 2004 and 2006 American Community Survey. Additional analysis of Census information has been published by Boston's governmental agencies, particularly the Office of New Bostonians and the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
13. MIRA headquarters are located at 105 Chauncy St., Boston, Massachusetts. For information on the organization see <http://www.miracoalition.org>.
14. Reverend Johnson is from the Beloved Community Center in Greensboro, North Carolina. A copy of his Washington speech can be obtained from <http://www.immigrationadvocates.org/calendar/event.176507-2006_LowIncome_Immigrant_Rights_Conference_Keynote_Address_by_Rev_Nelson_Johnson>.
15. For discussion of Reverend Johnson and the relation between civil rights and immigrant rights, see MIRA interviews, February 1 and May 16, 2008.
16. GBIO is headquartered at 594 Columbia Rd., Dorchester, Massachusetts. For the GBIO website, see <http://www.gbio.org/aboutus.html>.
17. Temple Emanuel is a conservative Synagogue located at 385 Ward St., Newton Centre, Massachusetts. The changes agreed to were modest: redesigning of the office of Elder Affairs website, improving the tele-

phone (1-88-AGE-INFO) system, and agreeing to design and implement a public education and marketing campaign so that caregivers and elders will know how to use the website, telephone system, and caregiver program. See "Terms of Understanding" a flyer distributed at the April 8th, 2008 assembly (copy of flyer in authors' possession).

18. The tenth anniversary celebration was called "Promise, Power, Possibilities," and was held in the Case Gymnasium at Boston University, 285 Babcock St., Boston, Massachusetts. An estimated 1,400 were in attendance. GBIO made a DVD of the celebration that is in the authors' possession.
19. Information available at <http://www.somoslatinoslgbt.org>. Interview with member of Somos Latinos LGBT, May 15, 2008.
20. Interview with Almeida, May 16, 2008, and with member of Somos Latinos LGBT, May 15, 2008. Interestingly, an organizer from GLAD-NY attended the Roxbury meeting on May 15, 2008 and commented on similar initiatives taking place in New York City.
21. Yescas saw such signs during the Boston Gay Pride March in 2004.
22. In this online journalistic piece, Thomson refers to a forum held at Northeastern University School of Law that offered counsel on the intersection of marriage and immigration law to same-sex binational couples. Dragon Fire no longer exists, but an audiotape of show is in possession of authors. See also interview with Will Thomson, June 11, 2008.

REFERENCES

Allen, James P., and Eugene Turner. "Boston's Emerging Ethnic Quilt: A Geographic Perspective." Unpublished paper. Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, 1 April 2004. Online posting: <http://www.csun.edu/ percent7Ehfgeg005/eturner/gallery/Bostonatlas/Bostonatlascover.html>.

Bada, Xochitl, Jonathan Fox, and Andrew Selee, eds. *Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United States.* Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006.

Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Traub, eds. *Racial Politics in American Cities.* New York: Longman, 1990.

Chauncey, George. *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940.* New York: Basic Books, 1995.

Cohen, Cathy. "Punk, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?" *Gay and Lesbian Quarterly* 3:4 (1997): 347-65.

Cummings, Richard. "Flooding Long Island: Aliens Invade the Hamptons," *The American Conservative* (February 28, 2005).

D'Emilio, John. *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Fine, Janice. *Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream.* Ithaca: ILR Press, 2006.

Flickr. "Lesbians and Gays Support Immigration Rights." 2006. Online posting: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/cinnachick/138904423>.

Gibson, Campbell. *Population Division Reports.* Washington, D.C.: The United States Bureau of the Census. Various

Gordon, Jennifer. *Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Greater Boston Interfaith Organization. "GBIO." 2008. Online posting: <http://www.gbio.org/aboutus.html>.

Hattam, Victoria. *In the Shadow of Race: Jews, Latinos and Immigrant Politics in the United States.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Hattam, Victoria, and Carlos Yescas. "Re-Imagining Political Opposition: Transnationalism and Sexuality in the Boston Immigrant Rights Coalition." Unpublished paper. Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Annual Meeting. San Jose, Costa Rica, July 2008.

Haney Lopez, Ian. "Hispanics and the Shrinking White Majority." *Daedalus* 134:1 (Winter 2005): 42-52.

Johnson, Rev. Nelson. "Low Income Immigrant Rights Conference Keynote Address." North Carolina: Beloved Community Center in Greensboro, 2006. Online posting: <http://www.immigrationadvocates.org/calendar/event.176507-2006_LowIncome_Immigrant_Rights_Conference_Keynote_Address_by_Rev_Nelson_Johnson/>.

Kotlowitz, Alex. "Our Town." *New York Times Magazine* (August 5, 2007).

Luibheid, Eithne, ed. *Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border.*

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition. "MIRA Coalition." 2008 Online posting: <http://www.miracoalition.org>.
North, David. "Same-Sex Marriage and Immigrant Rights—An Issue that Could Tear Apart the Open Borders Coalition?" 2009 Online posting: <http://www.cis.org/north/samesexeimmigration>.
Office of New Bostonians. <http://www.cityofboston.gov/newbostonians>.
Ostendorf, David L. "Workers, Go Home! The Anti-Immigrant Movement, Long Island, New York." *The Christian Century* (December 19, 2001).
———. "Illegal Immigrants Clash with Locals on Long Island." *USA Today,* August 4, 2005.
Somerville, Siobhan, "Scientific Racism and the Emergence of the Homosexual Body." *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 5:2 (1994): 243-66.
———. "Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State: A Queer Reading of the 1952 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act." *Queer Migrations: Sexuality, US Citizenship, and Border Crossings.* Eds. Eithne Luibheid and Lionel Cantu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Somos Latinos LGBT. "Somos Latin@s." 2008. Online posting: <http://www.somoslatinoslgbt.org>.
Sandoval, Carlos, and Catherine Tambini. *Farmingville.* Documentary. New York: Camino Bluff Productions, Inc., 2000.
Sanjek, Roger. *The Future of Us All: Race and Neighborhood in New York City.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Thomson, Will. "NAFTA Partners: Documenting Love, Marriage and International Intrigue." *Dragon Fire Online Magazine*. Drexel University, May 25, 2005.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. "American Fact Finder." Available at <http://www.census.gov>.
———. "2006 American Community Survey."
———. *Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000. Current Population Reports/Special Studies, P23-206.* Washington, D.C.: United States Bureau of the Census, December 2001.

U.S. Congress. "The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437)." 2005.
———. "Emergency Supplemental Appropiations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (H.R. 1268)." 2005.
———. "Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minorities Act - DREAM Act." 2007.
Weston, K. "Get Thee to a Big City: Sexual Imaginary and the Great Gay Migration." *Glo* 2:3 (1995): 253-78.

INTERVIEWS

Almeira, Marcony. Interview. February 1, 2008.
Almeira, Marcony. Interview. May 16, 2008.
Barrios, Jarrett T. Interview. February 1, 2008.
Consulate of Mexico. Interview. May 14, 2008.
Delaney, Daniel. Interview. May 15, 2008.
Forry, Bill. Interview. June 10, 2008.
GBIO. "Delegate's Assembly." April 8, 2008.
Gordon, Larry. Interview. June 10, 2008.
Hume, Ellen. Interview. May 14, 2008.
Kurtz, Cory B. Interview. January 31, 2008.
Labiosa, Wilfred. Interview. May 15, 2008.
Miller, Melvin, Interview. 10 June 2008.
Miller, Yawu Jr. Interview. June 10, 2008.
de Oliveira, Eduardo A., Interview. June 9, 2008.
Small, Horace. Interview. June 9, 2008.
Somos Latinos LGBT, "Latino Pride 08 Political Community Discussion." Panel. May 15, 2008.
Thomson, Will. Interview. June 11, 2008.